Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Danny Kleinsmith vs. Allied Van Lines, Gulf
Insurance Group, The Empoyers' Reinsurance fund
and the Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Sharon J. Eblen; Erie V. Boorman; Anne Swensen; Snow, Christensen and Martineau.
Brian D. Kelm; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Danny Kleinsmith v. Allied Van Lines, No. 930151 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5023

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF Af
UTAH

DCOJ,AE>lT
KFU
50
•A 10

DQCKFTNn

n

Hjxnhj

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANNY KLEINSMITH,
Petitioner,
Case No. 93 0151-CA

vs.
ALLIED VAN LINES, GULF
INSURANCE GROUP, THE
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
and the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Priority Class: 7

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ALLIED VAN LINES AND
GULF INSURANCE COMPANY
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REVIEW
OF ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
Post Office Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610
Attorney for Employers'
Reinsurance Fund
Brian D. Kelm, Esq.
350 South 400 East, Suite 122W
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner

Anne Swensen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorney for Allied Van
Lines and Gulf Insurance

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

DEC 1 0 1993

J^aryT.Noonan
Cierk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANNY KLEINSMITH,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 93 0151-CA

ALLIED VAN LINES, GULF
INSURANCE GROUP, THE
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
and the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

Priority Class: 7

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ALLIED VAN LINES AND
GULF INSURANCE COMPANY
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR REVIEW
OF ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Post Office Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
Post Office Box 146610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6610
Attorney for Employers'
Reinsurance Fund
Brian D. Kelm, Esq.
350 South 400 East, Suite 122W
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Petitioner

Anne Swensen, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Attorney for Allied Van
Lines and Gulf Insurance

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

4

ARGUMENT

4

POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY HELD THAT
MR. KLEINSMITH'S INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DID NOT
RESULT IN PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY
POINT II.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAD NO OBLIGATION TO SUBMIT THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL
PANEL
CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

4

9
10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES CITED
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission of Utah.
703 P.2d 306 (Utah 1985)

10

Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63
(9 Utah App. 1989)

1

Hone v. J.F. Shea Company, 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986)

9

Intermountain Health v. Bd. of Review, 839 P.2d 841
(Utah App. 1992)

10

Kerans v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985)
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954
(Utah App. 1988)
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581
(Utah 1991)
Tasters Ltd. v. Dept. of Employment Security,
222 UAR 63 (Filed September 24, 1993)
Wagstaff v. Department of Employment S e c . 826 P.2d 1069
(Utah App. 1992)

... 5
6,8
2
1, 2
2

STATUTES CITED
U.C.A. § 35-1-77 (1953)

9

U.C.A. § 35-1-77(1) (a)

2

U.C.A. § 35-1-82.53 (1988)

1

U.C.A. § 35-1-86 (1988)

1

U.C.A. § 63-46b-16 (1988)

1

U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1988)

1

-ii-

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Page
Utah Administrative Code Rule 568-1-9

2,9

Utah Administrative Code Rule 568-1-17 (c)

2, 8

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 14

1

-iii-

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to U.C.A. Sections 35-1-82.53 (1988), 35-1-86
(1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 14
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FINDING THAT
KLEINSMITH'S INDUSTRIAL INJURY DID NOT RESULT IN A
PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY.

II.

WHETHER THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN REFUSING TO REFER
THE CASE TO A MEDICAL PANEL
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This Court's review of the decision of the Industrial

Commission is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989).

Because Kleinsmith

challenges the Commission's findings of fact, arguing that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the applicable section of the UAPA is 63-46b-16(4)(g). Under this section,
an agency's factual findings will be affirmed "only if they are
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court.'"

Tasters Ltd. v. Dept. of

Employment Security, 222 UAR 63, 65 (Filed September 24, 1993),
citing Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (9
Utah App. 19 89).
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The substantial evidence test mandates that the party
challenging the factual findings must marshall all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the
supporting facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
therefrom, the findings are not supported by substantial evidence
given the record as a whole.

Id.

Kleinsmith also suggests that the Administrative Law Judge
misapplied the law in determining the cause of his disability and
in refusing to refer the matter to a medical panel.

The standard

of review utilized depends on the existence of a statutory grant
of discretion to the agency.

Tasters, supra. citing Morton

Int'l. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 583-89 (Utah
1991).

Where there is a grant of discretion to the agency, the

agency is entitled to a degree of deference such that it should
be affirmed if its decision is reasonable and rational."
Tasters, supra, citing Wagstaff v. Department of Employment S e c ,
826 P.2d 1069, 1071-72 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statute in this case is 35-1-77 (1) (a),
Utah Code Annotated.

Rules 568-1-9 and 568-1-17(c) of the

Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules are also applicable.
Copies of the statute and rules are set forth in the Addendum as
Exhibit A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants Allied Van Lines and Gulf Insurance Company adopt
Kleinsmith's Statement of the Case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Allied Van Lines and Gulf Insurance Company
generally adopt Kleinsmith's Statement of Facts but point out
that Mr, Kleinsmith's second heart attack, on May 11, 1991, was
not simultaneous with receipt of word from his occupational
health insurance carrier that his neck surgery would not be
covered.

In fact, the heart attack occurred three weeks

following receipt of the letter denying coverage.

(R. 427)

Following Mr. Kleinsmith's five vessel coronary bypass
operation on June 12, 1984, he was off work for about a year, not
a few months (R. 43 0); and then suffered another industrial
injury on July 30, 1989, when he fell off a six-foot ladder onto
his back and neck and injured his heel.
five weeks after that fall.

He was off work four or

(R. 400-404)

On July 8, 1991, Dr. Church indicated that Mr. Kleinsmith
would be totally disabled from his neck alone for another six
weeks, (R. 342) and assigned a 20% permanent partial disability
rating (R. 341); then on September 26, 1991 he opined that Mr.
Kleinsmith was permanently, totally disabled because of his age
and his recent myocardial infarction.
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(R. 343)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding
that there is no causal connection between Mr. Kleinsmith's
October 31, 1990 industrial injury and a determination of
permanent, total disability.

The medical records of Kleinsmith's

treating physicians support such a finding.
Applicant relies on medical reports obtained and submitted
after the hearing and also relies on a letter from the Social
Security Administration dated May 26, 1992, six and one-half
weeks following the hearing, to argue that Kleinsmith's
industrial injury might also be a factor in his Social Security
Disability Determination, had it only been considered.
Substantial evidence need not be uncontradicted evidence.

A

determination of permanent total disability is a question of
fact, and the findings of the ALJ have not exceeded the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality and should not be disturbed.
The Administrative Law Judge is granted statutory discretion
in referring medical issues to a medical panel and the facts of
this case do not call for a mandatory referral.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY HELD THAT
MR. KLEINSMITH'S INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT DID NOT
RESULT IN PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY
The applicant asserts that the medical and testimonial
evidence in the record supports his contention that the
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industrial accident of October 31, 1990, rendered him permanently
and totally disabled due to his back condition.

He asserts that

his social security disability benefits were awarded solely on
the basis of his coronary condition because the Social Security
Administration did not consider his back condition when they made
the award, and that the ALJ simply adopted those findings to deny
his claim.
The ALJ noted that the applicant's heart condition was not
industrially related and that he was awarded social security
disability solely on the basis of his non-industrial heart
condition.

(R. 109)

She also noted that his cervical problems

were, at best, due to a combination of industrial as well as preexisting causes, and that the issue before the Commission was
whether or not the October 1990 industrial injury was a significant cause of Kleinsmith's permanent and total disability status.
(R. 110)
A determination of permanent total disability is a question
of fact.
19 85).

Kerans v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah
There is substantial evidence in the record to support

the ALJ's determination that the applicant is not permanently and
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident of
October 31, 1990.
The industrial injury of October 31, 1990 must be a
"dominant" or "significant" cause of Kleinsmith's disability in
order to find permanent and total disability as a result thereof.
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Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988).
There is absolutely no medical evidence in the record to support
such a claim, even if the letters and records obtained and submitted by Kleinsmith after the hearing are considered.
Dr. Church, a neurologist who treated Mr. Kleinsmith for his
cervical problems, did not solely attribute Kleinsmith's back and
neck problems to his industrial injury of October 31, 1990, but
nevertheless gave him a 20% disability rating following his neck
surgery.

This is not a permanent, total disability.

In a subse-

quent visit, Dr. Church opined that Kleinsmith was unable to work
due to his age and myocardial infarction.

(R. 343).

Dr. Redd stated that Kleinsmith had pre-existing coronary
artery disease and that he ". . . probably had gradual
progression of his coronary artery disease and likely had some
recurrent stenosis and occlusions of the bypass grafts placed 6
years ago.

This combination with moderately elevated blood

pressure likely resulted in his heart attack."

(R. 353). Dr.

Redd gave Mr. Kleinsmith an overall impairment rating of 65% of
the whole person (R. 358), considerably more than the 20% rating
attributed by Dr. Church for cervical problems.
Dr. Boyd Holbrook reviewed the medical records at the
request of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, observing that "the
pathology in the cervical spine was preexisting.

The first

accident in July or August 1989 precipitated it to a symptomatic
standpoint from which it never recovered."
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(R. 69)

Dr. Holbrook

concluded that the industrial accident did not specifically cause
any identifiable pathological process and that it did not appear
that any of the permanent impairment should be ascribed to the
fall of October 31, 1990 as the ultimate surgery was inevitable.
(R. 70)
Kleinsmith relies on a letter from Dr. Albrand, whom
Kleinsmith did not even see until several weeks after the hearing.

By his own admission, Dr. Albrand did not review all of the

records, but relied solely on history taken from Mr. Kleinsmith.
(R.133)

Judge Church weighed the evidence, as she has the

discretion to do, and apparently relied on the reports of
Kleinsmith's longstanding heart doctor, Edward Redd; and the
reports of Mr. Kleinsmith7s treating physician for his neck and
back complaints, Dr. Glen Church, and gave the other reports the
weight they deserved.
The letter from the Social Security Administration, written
over six weeks after the hearing, but which Kleinsmith suggests
the ALJ relied on, does clarify that the Social Security
Determination was based on the records of Dr. Redd, a cardiologist.

The records of Dr. Church were not considered, apparently

because Kleinsmith himself did not submit them for whatever
reason.

Nevertheless, the statement by the SSI Operations

Supervisor that "it may well be that he could have qualified for
SSI benefits upon those [neck/back/upper extremities] problems as
well".

(R. 72)

This does not rise to the level of a "dominant"
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or "significant" cause or that of substantial evidence.

To

speculate that Kleinsmith's cervical problems may have been the
basis for an SSI disability is simply that--speculation.
The Industrial Accident Division's rules on permanent total
disability require that the ALJ determine "if a significant cause
of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some
other unrelated cause or causes."

U.A.C. R568-1-17(C) (1992);

See Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App.
1988).

A review of the entire record fails to show a causal

connection between the industrial accident of October 31, 1990
and a finding of permanent, total disability.
Kleinsmith suffered from arthritic and degenerative conditions in his cervical spine prior to the accident of October 31,
1990.

Dr. Albrand asserted that there is a causal connection

between the October 1990 accident and the applicant's disability,
but failed to discuss the extent of that disability in relation
to the applicant's pre-existing conditions or the significance of
that disability in relation to Kleinsmith's overall health.

All

of the doctors who examined the applicant discussed his disability from his neck and coronary conditions, but none of them
attempted to relate the various disabilities to a specific industrial or non-industrial cause.

There is no competent medical

evidence which shows that the applicant's cervical problems are a
"significant" cause of his disability, or even that his cervical
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problems were solely caused by his industrial accident; in fact,
the evidence is to the contrary.
Kleinsmith has failed to completely satisfy his obligation
to marshal the evidence by persistently arguing his own position
without regard for the evidence supporting the ALJ's findings.
This Court should thus decline to disturb the findings made by
the ALJ and ratified by the Industrial Commission.
POINT II.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAD NO OBLIGATION TO SUBMIT THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL
Reference to the medical panel is controlled by statute.

In

1982, the legislature amended U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-77 and changed
the requirement of a mandatory referral to the medical panel to a
permissive referral.

Hone v. J.F. Shea Company, 728 P.2d 1008,

1012 (Utah 1986).
The Administrative Law Judge did not abuse her statutory
discretion in refusing to refer this matter to a medical panel.
Kleinsmith suggests that reference to a medical panel is mandatory under Rule R568-1-9, and that the failure to do so is plain
error.

He relies on the rationale of old Utah cases interpreting

the former mandatory referral statute.
The criteria outlined in R568-1-9 for referral to a medical
panel deal with controversies of degree of disability, period of
disability and medical expenses.
an issue as to medical causation.
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The criteria does not include

The statute clearly leaves to the discretion of the Administrative Law Judge the determination of whether to refer to a medical
panel after review of the evidence, including applicant's testimony, medical records and other documents.
The ALJ, not the medical panel, is responsible for making
the actual decision regarding medical causation.

Intermountain

Health v. Bd, of Review, 839 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1992).

In

Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 703 P.2d
306 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court pointed out that in some
cases, such as where the evidence of causal connection between
the work-related event and the injury is uncertain or highly
technical, failure to refer the case to a medical panel may be an
abuse of discretion.

Id. at 308.

However, on the facts of

Champion the court found no abuse of discretion.

Similarly,

there is no uncertainty or highly technical issue in this case
and the ALJ in this case did not abuse her discretion in relying
on the substantial evidence presented at the hearing in determining that the medical causation of Kleinsmith's permanent,
total disability was his myocardial infarction.

The fact that

the applicant disagrees with the ALJ's finding does not create an
uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the
findings made by the Administrative Law Judge and ratified by the
Industrial Commission.
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DATED this

fQ

day of December, 1993.

SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

((MUJL JW&44AC<<^

Anne Swensen
Attorneys for Respondents Allied
Van Lines and Gulf Insurance
Company

07741.327\Brief

-11-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ALLIED VAN LINES AND GULF

INSURANCE COMPANY were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following
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WORKERS* COMPENSATION

35-1-77

35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.

R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical
Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1. One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant
medical issues axe involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel
report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize
an injured worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing
these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for further
medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

R568-1-17. Permanent Total Disability.
A. The Commission is required under Section
35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of total disability
as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use of the term "substance of
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to
confer some latitude on the Commission in exercising
a degree of discretion in making its findings relative
to permanent total disability. The Commission does
not interpret the code section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until rehabilitation training and/or
evaluation has been accomplished.
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee has made, or is in the process
of making, a determination of disability under the
foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own
behalf.
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine if a significant cause of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or
causes.

